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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
         Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. brought this 
declaratory judgment action against Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Company and the London Market Insurers, seeking a declaration 
that defendants' insurance policies covered the cost of 
environmental clean-up at Chemical Leaman's Bridgeport, New 
Jersey facility.  After a three week trial, a jury found Chemical 
Leaman was entitled to partial coverage under several policies.  
Thereafter the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Morton Intern., 
Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994), which interprets several key 
provisions of comprehensive general liability insurance policies 
in the context of environmental pollution.  Defendant insurers 
now appeal, contending the district court incorrectly instructed 
the jury on whether Chemical Leaman "expected or intended" to 
cause environmental damage under Morton.  We believe Mortonrequires an 
inquiry into the insured's subjective intent to cause 
environmental harm, unless "exceptional circumstances" support a 
presumption of the insured's subjective intent.  Therefore we 
conclude the district court's jury instructions were proper. 
         Defendant insurers raise several other issues on 
appeal.  They argue the district court mistakenly limited the 
applicability of the policies' pollution exclusion clause, 
incorrectly adopted the "continuous trigger" theory as New Jersey 
law, and ignored the prejudicial effect of Chemical Leaman's 
failure to file its claims for coverage in a timely manner.  They 
also dispute the district court's exclusion of evidence relating 
to environmental contamination at other Chemical Leaman 
facilities.  We will affirm the district court's holdings on the 
pollution exclusion clause, the "continuous trigger" theory, and 
timely notice.  We also conclude that the exclusion of certain 
evidence was within the sound discretion of the district court. 
                          I.  Background 
           A.  Contamination at the Bridgeport Facility 
         Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., a tank truck company 
that specializes in the transport of chemicals and other liquids, 
operates a number of tank truck cleaning facilities around the 
country, including one in Bridgeport, New Jersey.  At the 
Bridgeport facility, Chemical Leaman disposed of rinsewater 
contaminated with chemical residue during the cleaning process 
into a water treatment system designed by Harry Elston, Chemical 
Leaman's Manager of Real Estate and Engineering, and Harry 
Wagner, a professional sanitary engineer.  At its inception in 
1960, the Bridgeport water treatment system consisted of three 
unlined ponds connected by "tee pipes."  The ponds were intended 
to purify rinsewater by filtering out contaminants as the water 
seeped into the soil.  The designers of the system believed that 
the forces of gravity would separate contaminates from the 
rinsewater, and that natural processes of aerobic and anaerobic 
microbial degradation would break down trace contaminants.  An 
overflow pipe drained from the final pond of the water treatment 
system into an adjacent swamp in order to allow water to escape 
in the case of heavy rains.   
         In September 1961, an Inspector with the New Jersey 
Division of Fish Game & Wildlife informed Chemical Leaman that 
its water treatment system was "not satisfactory."  In response, 
Chemical Leaman constructed two additional aeration lagoons and a 
settling lagoon with a limestone bed.  The lagoons were designed 
to function in the same manner as the first three ponds.  But the 
overflow pipe still drained from the last lagoon into the 
neighboring swamp. 
         Water pollution inspectors with the New Jersey 
Department of Health observed discharge from the overflow pipe 
into the swamp in November 1968.  They found the discharge to be 
"highly pollutional" and ordered Chemical Leaman to submit a plan 
to improve its water treatment system.  In May 1969, Chemical 
Leaman submitted a plan, but state regulators found it to be 
unsatisfactory.  Thereafter state regulators and Chemical Leaman 
unsuccessfully attempted to reach agreement.  Finally, on January 
28, 1974, Chemical Leaman and the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection entered into a consent decree in which 
Chemical Leaman agreed to construct an approved water treatment 
facility.  In 1975, Chemical Leaman arranged for its wastewater 
to be treated by Du Pont and ceased to use the system of ponds 
and lagoons.  Subsequently, Chemical Leaman drained the ponds and 
lagoons, dredged them, and filled them with brickbat, sand and 
concrete. 
         In 1980, a routine survey by the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection discovered groundwater contamination 
at and around the Bridgeport site.  Subsequent investigations 
established that the ponds and lagoons were the primary source of 
groundwater contamination on the site, and that several private 
wells near the facility were either contaminated or threatened 
with contamination.  The federal Environmental Protection Agency 
placed the Bridgeport site on the Superfund National Priorities 
List in 1984, and, in 1985, Chemical Leaman entered into a 
consent order with the EPA.  Chemical Leaman admitted liability 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liabilities Act ("CERCLA") and agreed to remediate the Bridgeport 
site or to pay for its remediation. 
         Chemical Leaman gave notice of claims to Aetna in April 
1988, and to the London Market insurers ("LMI") in March 1989.  
Aetna and the LMI refused to defend or indemnify Chemical Leaman 
for costs incurred in connection with the clean-up of the 
Bridgeport site.  Chemical Leaman then filed this suit.  
                    B.  The Insurance Policies 
         Chemical Leaman purchased comprehensive general 
liability insurance from Aetna covering successive years from 
April 1, 1959 through April 1, 1985.  It purchased excess 
comprehensive general liability policies covering the same period 
from the LMI. The LMI challenge the district court's 
interpretation of several provisions of the policies purchased by 
Chemical Leaman.  Because Aetna has withdrawn from this appeal, 
we need not discuss its policies. 
         The LMI policies were standard form "occurrence-based" 
policies, meaning they insured against "occurrences" as defined 
in the policies.  The insuring clause in the LMI policies 
typically stated that the LMI agreed: 
         [s]ubject to the limitations, terms and 
         conditions [of the policy] to indemnify the 
         Assured for all sums which the Assured shall 
         be obligated to pay by reason of the 
         liability . . . imposed upon the Assured by 
         law, . . . for damages . . . on account of: 
         . . . (ii) Property Damage . . . caused by or 
         arising out of each occurrence. 
The LMI policies defined "occurrence" as "[a]n accident or a 
happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions which unexpectedly and unintentionally results 
in . . . property damage . . . during the policy period"  
(emphasis added).  The combined effect of the insuring clause and 
the definition of "occurrence" is to preclude coverage for 
property damage that is expected or intended by the insured.  On 
appeal, the LMI contend the district court incorrectly instructed 
the jury on the legal standard by which to evaluate Chemical 
Leaman's expectation or intention to cause property damage. 
         Each LMI policy in effect from 1971 to 1985 also 
contained a pollution exclusion clause.  The LMI policies in 
effect from April 1, 1971 to April 1, 1974, and from April 1, 
1977 to April 1, 1985 contained the standard form exclusion known 
as NMA 1685.  NMA 1685 does not cover personal injury or property 
damage caused by seepage, pollution, or contamination unless 
"such seepage, pollution or contamination is caused by a sudden, 
unintended and unexpected happening during the period of [the] 
insurance."  The LMI policies in effect from April 1, 1974 to 
April 1, 1977 contained the standard industry pollution exclusion 
clause, the so-called "ISO" pollution exclusion, which precludes 
coverage for pollution and contamination, unless the "discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental."  Both the 
ISO pollution exclusion clause and the NMA 1685 pollution 
exclusion clause focus on the insured's intention and expectation 
to discharge pollutants, not on the insured's intention or 
expectation to cause property damage.  On appeal, the LMI argue 
the pollution exclusion clauses bar coverage under the 1971 to 
1985 policies because Chemical Leaman's discharges of pollutants 
were not sudden, unintended, or unexpected. 
         Finally, the LMI policies require the insured to 
provide written notice "as soon as practicable" following an 
occurrence.  The LMI argue that Chemical Leaman's failure to 
comply with this provision bars coverage.    
                     II.  Procedural History 
         Chemical Leaman filed this declaratory judgment action 
in 1989 after the insurers' refusal to indemnify it for the costs 
of environmental clean-up at the Bridgeport facility.  Following 
extensive discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment on various grounds.  The district court granted partial 
summary judgment in favor of Chemical Leaman, holding that New 
Jersey law applied, and that the "owned property exclusion" did 
not bar coverage for the costs of remediation of onsite soil 
contamination designed to correct injury to surrounding 
properties.  See Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 788 F. Supp. 846 (D.N.J. 1992).   
         After subsequent cross-motions for summary judgment, 
the district court held Chemical Leaman bore the burden of 
proving it did not subjectively expect or intend the damage to 
the soil and groundwater for which it sought coverage.  SeeChemical Leaman 
Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. 
Supp. 1136, 1146 (D.N.J. 1993).  It also found Chemical Leaman's 
actions were not so "reprehensible" as to objectively establish 
that it expected or intended to cause damage.  Id.  The court 
then denied the cross-motions for summary judgment because there 
remained genuine issues of fact about Chemical Leaman's 
subjective intent.  Id. at 1152. 
         The district court also held as a matter of law that 
damage to the soil and groundwater occurred during the April 1, 
1960 to April 1, 1961 policy year because Chemical Leaman began 
depositing rinsewater in the ponds during that time period.  The 
district court noted that from 1960 to 1975, Chemical Leaman 
disposed of 10,000 to 20,000 gallons of rinsewater into the ponds 
each day, but did not find that property damage occurred during 
that period as a matter of law.  Id.  Rather, it ruled that New 
Jersey follows the "continuous trigger" theory and that factual 
issues remained as to whether Chemical Leaman suffered 
continuous, indivisible property damage from 1961 to 1985. 
         The district court interpreted the pollution exclusion 
clauses in the LMI's post-1971 policies as precluding coverage 
"when the insured has caused the discharge of contaminants or 
pollutants, unless the discharge was neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the insured."  Id. at 1157.  On 
the basis of the pollution exclusion clauses, the district court 
granted partial summary judgment in favor of defendants as to 
soil damage on the post-1971 policies.  It denied summary 
judgment with respect to groundwater contamination, and did not 
address contamination to the surrounding wetlands.  Id.  Finally, 
the district court held Chemical Leaman's failure to give timely 
notice of its claims did not preclude insurance coverage because 
the delay had not prejudiced the defendant insurers.  Id. at 
1157-58. 
         Before trial, Chemical Leaman filed a motion in limineto exclude 
evidence relating to waste disposal sites other than 
Bridgeport.  The district court granted the motion, holding the 
other-site evidence more prejudicial than probative and unduly 
time consuming.   
         After a three week trial, the jury found that Chemical 
Leaman was entitled to coverage for damage to the soil and 
wetlands under the April 1, 1960 to April 1, 1971 policies, and 
to coverage for damage to the groundwater under the April 1, 1960 
to April 1, 1981 policies.  In reaching its verdict, the jury 
answered detailed interrogatories on Chemical Leaman's intent and 
expectation to cause property damage and to discharge pollutants 
during each policy year.  After oral argument before this Court, 
Chemical Leaman and Aetna settled all claims arising from this 
dispute.  The LMI now appeals the district court's legal 
determinations and the jury's verdict. 
         We have jurisdiction to review the final judgment of 
the district court under 28 U.S.C.  1291.  The district court 
held New Jersey law governs, which the parties do not dispute.  
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 788 F. 
Supp. at 851.  As a federal court sitting in diversity, we must 
apply the substantive law of New Jersey.  Borse v. Pierce Goods 
Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1992).  Our review of the 
district court's interpretation of New Jersey law is plenary.  
Wiley v. State Farm  Fire & Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 457, 459 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
         III. Occurrence-Based Insurance Policies 
              and "Expected or Intended" 
         Chemical Leaman purchased "occurrence-based" 
comprehensive general liability insurance from the LMI that 
provided coverage for "[a]n accident or a happening or event or a 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which unexpectedly 
and unintentionally results in . . . property damage."  The LMI 
contend that because Chemical Leaman "expected" or "intended" to 
cause property damage at the Bridgeport site, the policies do not 
provide coverage. 
         New Jersey courts have been called upon repeatedly to 
interpret the "expected/intended" clause in occurrence-based 
insurance policies.  They have sought to balance the need to 
compensate victims against the public policy of deterring 
intentional wrongdoing by denying coverage for its consequences.  
In companion cases, Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 
1255 (N.J. 1992), and SL Industries, Inc. v. American Motorists 
Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
addressed how the "expected/intended" clause should be 
interpreted in order to strike the correct balance. 
         In Voorhees, the New Jersey Supreme Court held the 
accidental nature of an occurrence is determined by analyzing 
whether the insured subjectively intended or expected to cause an 
injury.  Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d at 1264.  
The court explained: 
         That interpretation prevents those who 
         intentionally cause harm from unjustly 
         benefitting from insurance coverage while 
         providing injured victims with the greatest 
         chance of compensation consistent with the 
         need to deter wrong-doing.  It also accords 
         with an insured's objectively-reasonable 
         expectation of coverage for unintentionally- 
         caused harm. 
Id. at 1264.  The court emphasized, "[e]ven when the actions in 
question seem foolhardy and reckless, the courts have mandated an 
inquiry into the actor's subjective intent to cause injury."  Id. 
         The court also recognized an "exceptional 
circumstances" exception to the subjective intent inquiry.  
         When the actions are particularly 
         reprehensible, the intent to injure can be 
         presumed from the act without an inquiry into 
         the actor's subjective intent to injure.  
         That objective approach focuses on the 
         likelihood that an injury will result from an 
         actor's behavior rather than on the 
         wrongdoer's subjective state of mind. 
Id. at 1265.  The court cited to sexual assault against children 
as an example of an act that is "so inherently injurious" that an 
intent to injure can be presumed.  Id. 
         In SL Industries, the court confronted the question 
"whether any intent to injure will render the resulting injury 
intentional [and preclude coverage], whether the wrongdoer must 
intend the specific injury that results, or whether there is some 
middle ground between the two approaches."  SL Industries, Inc. 
v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d at 1277 (emphasis in 
original).  After evaluating alternative theories, the court 
adopted the "middle ground," which it summarized as follows: 
         Assuming the wrongdoer subjectively intends 
         or expects some sort of injury, that intent 
         will generally preclude coverage.  If there 
         is evidence that the extent of the injuries 
         was improbable, however, then the court must 
         inquire as to whether the insured 
         subjectively intended or expected to cause 
         that injury.  Lacking that intent, the injury 
         was "accidental" and coverage will be 
         provided. 
Id. at 1278.  SL Industries involved an allegation of intentional 
fraud that "presupposes a general subjective intent to injure."  
Accordingly the New Jersey Supreme Court remanded the cases for a 
determination of whether the injury suffered by the victim was 
improbable, and if so, whether the insured intended or expected 
the victim's actual injuries.  Id. at 1279.  The court noted this 
approach "conforms to an insured's objectively-reasonable 
expectations and provides the victim the greatest possibility of 
additional compensation consistent with the goal of deterring 
intentional wrongdoing."  Id. 
         The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the 
expected/intended clause of comprehensive general liability 
policies in the environmental pollution context in Morton 
Intern., Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994).  It attempted to apply the 
principles established in Voorhees and SL Industries, but was 
forced to "acknowledge the impracticality of adherence to the 
general rule that `we will look to the insured's subjective 
intent to determine intent to injure.'"  Id. at 879.  The court 
then elaborated upon Voorhees' "exceptional circumstances" 
exception, which allows an intent to injure to be presumed 
without inquiry into the actor's subjective intent. 
              [W]e hold that in environmental-coverage 
         litigation a case-by-case analysis is 
         required to determine whether, in the context 
         of all the available evidence, "exceptional 
         circumstances exist that objectively 
         establish the insured's intent to injure."  
         Voorhees, 607 A.2d at 1265.  Those 
         circumstances include the duration of the 
         discharges, whether the discharges occurred 
         intentionally, negligently, or innocently, 
         the quality of the insured's knowledge 
         concerning the harmful propensities of the 
         pollutants, whether regulatory authorities 
         attempted to discourage or prevent the 
         insured's conduct, and the existence of 
         subjective knowledge concerning the 
         possibility or likelihood of harm. 
Id. at 879-80.  The court cautioned, "insureds held responsible 
for remediation of environmental pollution vary significantly in 
their degree of culpability for the harm caused by pollutant 
discharges."  Therefore, "[a] general rule in environmental- 
pollution coverage litigation that would permit intent to injure 
to be presumed simply on the basis of a knowing discharge of 
pollutants would be unjustified."  Id. at 879. 
         The New Jersey Supreme Court applied the factors it had 
outlined to determine whether "exceptional circumstances" 
supported the presumption of an intent to cause property damage.  
It noted Morton and predecessors had polluted Berry's Creek to 
such an extent that "[f]or a stretch of several thousand feet, 
the concentration of mercury . . . [was] the highest found in 
fresh water sediments in the world."  Id. at 834.  This damage 
was caused by the discharge of pollutants from a mercury- 
processing plant over a period of at least eighteen, and perhaps 
as many as forty-five, years.  Id. at 882.  Moreover, for at 
least eighteen years the discharges had been intentional, even 
though the company knew they would cause environmental harm.  
Despite repeated complaints by regulatory agencies, Morton 
engaged in "a pattern of `stonewalling' . . . characterized by 
promises of compliance that consistently were unfulfilled."  Id.   
On the basis of these facts, the court held, it "would have 
ignored reality to conclude that [Morton's] predecessors did not 
know that the mercury and its effluents was [sic] harmful to the 
land over which it coursed and the waters into which it fell."  
Id. at 884.  Therefore, it held as a matter of law that the 
property damage was not caused by an "occurrence" within the 
meaning of the applicable insurance policies. 
         Morton's presumption of an insured's subjective intent 
to cause property damage from egregious circumstances does not 
hinge on whether the insured should have expected or intended to 
cause injury.  This would be akin to a negligence standard.  If 
negligent acts did not fall within the definition of a covered 
occurrence, then there would be no point in purchasing 
comprehensive general liability insurance.  Pittston Co. v. 
Allianz Ins. Co., 905 F. Supp. 1279, 1301 (D.N.J. 1995).  While 
Morton pragmatically acknowledges courts should not "ignore 
reality" when exceptional circumstances establish the insured's 
subjective intent to injure, the insured's subjective intent to 
cause injury remains the relevant inquiry under the occurrence 
language. 
         In Morton, the New Jersey Supreme Court also addressed 
the applicability of SL Industries' improbability rule in 
environmental pollution coverage litigation.  It explained: 
         Turning to the question of whether 
         environmental injury was intended or 
         expected, we first observe that although the 
         magnitude of damage to Berry's Creek and the 
         surrounding areas may exceed any intention or 
         expectation attributable to Morton's 
         predecessors, we do not consider differences 
         in harm relating to severity of environmental 
         damage give rise to a finding of 
         "improbability" of harm that invokes the need 
         for evidence of subjective intent.  SL 
         Industries, supra.  . . .  The holding of SL 
         Industries was based on the Appellate 
         Division's ruling . . . that in a coverage 
         action arising from a fight between two young 
         teenagers in which one sustained a broken 
         hip, a factual issue was presented because of 
         the inherent improbability that the skirmish 
         would result in a hip fracture.  No such 
         inherent "improbability" can be ascribed to 
         the environmental damage attributable to 
         Morton's predecessors. 
Morton Intern., Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d at 882 
(citations omitted).  Therefore the court concluded it did not 
have to inquire into Morton's subjective intent to cause the 
specific environmental damage at issue.  
         In this case, the district court interpreted New Jersey 
law on the "expected/intended" clause before the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's decision in Morton.  Nevertheless, it instructed 
the jury to determine whether Chemical Leaman subjectively 
expected or intended to cause property damage at the Bridgeport 
site.  At the end of trial, on the LMI's Rule 50(a) motion for 
judgement as a matter of law, the district court found that the 
harm to the environment caused by the Bridgeport water treatment 
system was improbable as a matter of law.  The district court 
also held Chemical Leaman's actions were not so reprehensible as 
to justify the presumption of an intent to cause property damage 
under the "exceptional circumstances" exception.  It concluded 
Chemical Leaman was not "throwing toxic waste out into the 
meadow-lands" as Morton and its predecessors had done; rather, it 
had "designed and built the facility to prevent [harm to the 
environment]."  Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. at 1146.   
         On appeal, the LMI argue the district court's jury 
instructions on the expected/intended issue were erroneous and 
inconsistent with New Jersey law.  They also assert the harm at 
the Bridgeport site was not improbable as a matter of law.  
Finally, they contend "exceptional circumstances" objectively 
establish Chemical Leaman's intent to cause property damage.  Our 
review of jury instructions is plenary.  See Hook v. Ernst & 
Young, 28 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 1994).  A jury charge, taken as 
a whole, must "fairly and adequately" submit the issues in the 
case to the jury.  Id. 
            A.  Jury Instruction on Expected/Intended 
         The district court instructed the jury that it should 
find for Chemical Leaman if Chemical Leaman did not subjectively 
expect or intend damage to the soil, groundwater, or wetlands at 
the Bridgeport site.  Midway through the trial, the court 
instructed the jury: 
         There are three kinds of damage at issue in 
         this case--soil contamination, groundwater 
         contamination, and swamp contamination . . . 
         You must evaluate Chemical Leaman by what you 
         believe were its actual, subjective 
         expectations or intentions with regard to 
         causing soil, groundwater and swamp damage . 
         . . 
At the end of the trial, the district court again instructed the 
jury: 
            "EXPECTED OR INTENDED" -- FOCUS ON DAMAGE 
 
              In determining Chemical Leaman's 
         expectations and intentions in the context of 
         basic coverage, you are instructed to focus 
         on whether the specific property damage was 
         expected or intended.  You are not to 
         consider whether the acts which caused that 
         property damage were intentional acts.  I 
         give you this instruction because it is New 
         Jersey law the unintended results of 
         intentional acts may be covered by 
         defendants' insurance policies.  Thus, even 
         though Chemical Leaman may have knowingly and 
         intentionally committed the acts that 
         ultimately led to the environmental damage at 
         the Bridgeport site, there still may be 
         insurance coverage as long as you find that 
         Chemical Leaman did not expect or intend the 
         specific property damage that is the subject 
         matter of this litigation, namely the 
         contamination of the soil, groundwater, or 
         wetlands. 
 
        "EXPECTED OR INTENDED" -- SPECIFIC DAMAGE STANDARD 
 
              I further instruct you that, in deciding 
         whether Chemical Leaman subjectively expected 
         or intended to cause property damage, you 
         must consider whether Chemical Leaman 
         subjectively expected or intended the very 
         damage that is the subject matter of this 
         case.  Thus, it is not sufficient for you to 
         find that Chemical Leaman expected or 
         intended any injury -- such as injury to the 
         environment generally.  Rather, you must 
         determine whether Chemical Leaman expected or 
         intended the actual property damage that it 
         is now required to clean-up. 
In addition, special interrogatories were submitted to the jury 
on Chemical Leaman's expectation and intention to cause damage to 
the soil, groundwater, and wetlands. 
         The LMI contend the district court's final jury 
instruction was erroneous because it instructed the jury "to 
focus on whether the specific property damage"--namely 
contamination to the soil, groundwater, or wetlands--"was 
expected or intended."  They argue the district should have 
instructed the jury that if Chemical Leaman "expected or 
intended" to cause some injury to the environment generally, then 
coverage was precluded unless the extent of the injury was 
improbable.  The LMI rely on SL Industries, in which the New 
Jersey Supreme Court stated: 
         Assuming the wrongdoer subjectively intends 
         or expects some sort of injury, that intent 
         will generally preclude coverage.  If there 
         is evidence that the extent of the injuries 
         was improbable, however, then the court must 
         inquire as to whether the insured 
         subjectively intended or expected to cause 
         that injury.  Lacking that intent, the injury 
         was "accidental" and coverage will be 
         provided. 
SL Industries, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d at 
1278.  The LMI contend Chemical Leaman intended to cause some 
injury because Chemical Leaman knew the rinsewater contained 
contaminants, and knew the contaminants would seep into the soil 
when deposited in the containment ponds.  They assert Chemical 
Leaman also knew discharges from the overflow pipe would drain 
into the swamp.  Therefore, they argue, Chemical Leaman intended 
"some sort of injury" as a matter of law, and coverage was 
precluded unless the extent of injury was improbable. 
         Although the LMI's argument possesses a certain appeal, 
we believe the New Jersey Supreme Court would reject it.  An 
insured who intentionally discharges a known pollutant generally 
intends "some sort of harm," however de minimis, and the harm 
that actually results is usually a probable result of the 
discharge.  Accordingly, the LMI's reading of SL Industries would 
result in a general rule precluding coverage based on the knowing 
discharge of a pollutant.  But in Morton Intern., Inc. v. General 
Acc. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d at 879-80, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held "a general rule . . . [precluding coverage] simply on the 
basis of a knowing discharge of pollutants would be unjustified."  
The LMI's reading of SL Industries' "some sort of injury" 
language conflicts with Morton. 
         Moreover, in SL Industries, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court confronted the problem of insurance coverage for injury 
caused by intentional, tortious conduct, namely intentional 
fraud.  But intentional tort cases are an imperfect analogy in 
the context of environmental pollution.  The insured who commits 
an intentional tort like fraud possesses some knowledge of the 
nature of the harm likely to result and intends to cause such 
harm.  Also, most intentional torts are committed in a single, 
discrete, and temporally limited incident.  In the context of 
environmental pollution, the insured's knowledge concerning the 
harmful propensities of pollutants and the likelihood of harm to 
the environment may be less complete and may vary significantly 
over time.  For example, it is a matter of historical fact that 
many insureds, acting in accordance with standard industry 
practices, intentionally discharged pollutants into unlined 
containment ponds or other inadequate waste treatment systems, 
but were unaware that groundwater damage would eventually result. 
         In Morton, the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged 
the unsuitability of prior case law on the expected/intended 
provision in environmental pollution coverage litigation.  
Morton, 629 A.2d at 879 ("In applying our holding in Voorhees to 
claims seeking coverage for property-damage caused by 
environmental pollution under occurrence-based CGL policies, we 
acknowledge the impracticality of adherence to the general rule 
that `we will look to the insured's subjective intent to 
determine intent to injure.'").  We believe the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would similarly reject a wooden application of SL 
Industries' "some sort of injury" language, and would instead 
look to the general principles underlying the interpretation of 
insurance-policy provisions involving intentional conduct.  As 
stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court: 
         Our goal is to interpret the insurance 
         provisions in light of the insured's 
         objectively reasonable expectations. . . .  
         [W]e must attempt to reconcile two goals:  
         that of deterring intentional wrongdoing by 
         precluding insurance indemnification, and 
         that of providing victims with compensation 
         to the extent that compensation will not 
         interfere with deterring injurious behavior. 
SL Industries, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d at 
1278.  We will apply these principles in this case. 
         In the environmental pollution context, the insured's 
appreciation of the magnitude and nature of harm likely to be 
caused by a discharge of pollutants is relevant in determining 
whether insurance coverage should be precluded. 
         When the injury caused significantly exceeds 
         the injury intended or expected . . . then it 
         is hard to characterize the injury as truly 
         "intentional." . . .  Moreover, if the 
         tortfeasor did not intend or expect to cause 
         the resulting harm, denying coverage will not 
         deter the harmful conduct.  In that case, 
         there is no policy justification for denying 
         the victim the possibility of additional 
         compensation. 
SL Industries, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d at 
1278.  If an insured does not understand the causal connection 
between the discharge of a pollutant and the property damage that 
results, deterrence is not served by precluding insurance 
coverage.  Moreover, where an insured does not intend or expect 
property damage of a particular nature to result from its 
discharge of pollutants, the insured has an "objectively 
reasonable expectation" of coverage should such property damage 
later manifest itself.  For these reasons, we cannot agree with 
the LMI's contention that some intent to cause any sort of 
environmental harm will preclude insurance coverage for all 
environmental harm under New Jersey law.  Rather we believe the 
New Jersey Supreme Court would inquire into the insured's intent 
or expectation to cause environmental harm of a particular sort, 
for example, whether the insured intended damage to the soil, 
groundwater, or wetlands.  Where the insured intends or expects 
such harm, coverage is precluded, unless, of course, the injury 
was improbable.  On the other hand, an insured's intent to cause 
environmental harm of one sort will not preclude coverage for 
other kinds of unintended and unexpected environmental harm.  For 
example, an insured's intent to cause soil damage will not 
preclude coverage for unintended and unexpected damage to the 
groundwater or wetlands. 
         The district court's jury instruction fairly and 
adequately asked the jury to consider whether Chemical Leaman 
expected or intended injury to the soil, groundwater, or 
wetlands.  The instruction also allowed the jury to consider the 
nature and extent of Chemical Leaman's knowledge regarding the 
likelihood of harm as that knowledge evolved over time.  There 
was ample evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that Chemical 
Leaman did not expect or intend to cause property damage.  
Chemical Leaman presented evidence that it believed the system of 
unlined ponds would cleanse contaminated rinsewater.  Although 
Chemical Leaman intentionally discharged known pollutants, a 
reasonable jury could find, and the jury here did find, Chemical 
Leaman did not expect or intend damage to the soil, groundwater 
or wetlands.  In light of the jury's findings, Chemical Leaman is 
entitled to insurance coverage for the costs of clean-up of 
environmental damage.  Because Chemical Leaman did not expect or 
intend damage to the soil, groundwater, or wetlands, we need not 
inquire whether the property damage at the Bridgeport site was an 
improbable result of Chemical Leaman's actions. 
          B.  The "Exceptional Circumstances" Exception 
         The LMI contend that under Voorhees' "exceptional 
circumstances" exception, Chemical Leaman's intent to cause 
property damage should be presumed as a matter of law. 
           As we have noted, in Morton the New Jersey Supreme 
Court set forth several factors to be considered in evaluating 
whether exceptional circumstances exist.  These include: 
         the duration of the discharges, whether the 
         discharges occurred intentionally, 
         negligently, or innocently, the quality of 
         the insured's knowledge concerning the 
         harmful propensities of the pollutants, 
         whether regulatory authorities attempted to 
         discourage or prevent the insured's conduct, 
         and the existence of subjective knowledge 
         concerning the possibility or likelihood of 
         harm. 
Morton Intern., Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d at 879- 
80.  We believe the New Jersey Supreme Court designed the 
"exceptional circumstances" exception to apply only to egregious 
conduct.  This much is apparent from the court's use of child 
sexual abuse as an illustration of conduct that is "so inherently 
injurious" as to warrant a presumption of intent to injure.  Id.at 879.  
Because "insureds held responsible for remediation of 
environmental pollution vary significantly in their degree of 
culpability for the harm caused by pollutant discharges,"  we 
believe "[a] general rule in environmental-pollution coverage 
litigation that would permit intent to injure to be presumed 
simply on the basis of a knowing discharge of pollutants would be 
unjustified."  Id. at 879-880. 
         Instead Morton mandates "a case-by-case analysis . . . 
in order to determine whether, in the context of all the 
available evidence, exceptional circumstances exist."  Id.  
Morton is instructive in considering the level of culpability 
required to allow intent to injure to be presumed in the 
environmental context.  In Morton, the insured intentionally 
discharged mercury-laden compounds directly into streams over a 
lengthy period of time.  The Department of Health and state 
engineers made repeated demands for compliance and the insured 
consistently disregarded its own promises to remediate the 
discharge.  Morton, 629 A.2d at 882.  "[T]he record fairly 
reflect[ed] a pattern of `stonewalling' on the part of [the 
insured], characterized by promises of compliance that 
consistently were unfulfilled."  Id. 
         We believe a reasonable jury could find Chemical Leaman 
did not engage in a "pattern of stonewalling."  On the contrary, 
a jury could conclude that Chemical Leaman's behavior suggests a 
good faith effort at compliance with agency demands.  Chemical 
Leaman initially designed the Bridgeport wastewater treatment 
system to purify contaminated rinseate in 1960.  The designers of 
the system believed that the sandy bottom of the unlined ponds 
would purify the contaminated rinsewater by acting as a natural 
filter, and the overflow pipe was intended as a safety valve to 
prevent a rupture in the berms of the containment ponds in the 
event of heavy rain.  When an inspector from the Pollution Unit 
of the New Jersey Division of Fish, Game & Wildlife advised 
Chemical Leaman of an unsatisfactory discharge into a neighboring 
swamp in September 1961, Chemical Leaman responded by 
constructing a second set of lagoons and the final settling 
lagoon.  Seven years later, water pollution inspectors from the 
New Jersey Department of Health concluded discharges from the 
lagoon were pollutional and, in February 1969, ordered Chemical 
Leaman to submit plans for a system to properly treat the 
effluent.  In May 1969, Chemical Leaman submitted a plan for a 
new rinsewater treatment system.  The New Jersey Department of 
Health rejected this plan and over the next four years the 
parties attempted to resolve their dispute until January 1974, 
when they entered into a consent judgment.  This history can 
hardly be described as "a pattern of `stonewalling' . . . 
characterized by promises of compliance that consistently were 
unfulfilled."  Morton, 629 A.2d at 882.  Accordingly, 
"exceptional circumstances" do not exist here that would permit a 
presumption of Chemical Leaman's subjective intent to cause 
property damage. 
                 IV.  Pollution Exclusion Clauses 
              The April 1, 1971 to April 1, 1985 LMI policies 
contained pollution exclusion clauses barring coverage for 
discharges of pollutants, unless such discharges were "sudden and 
accidental" or "sudden, unintended, and unexpected."  The LMI 
argued to the district court that coverage was precluded because 
the discharge of pollutants at the Bridgeport site was not 
"sudden."  The district court rejected the LMI's argument, 
relying on a line of New Jersey cases beginning with Broadwell 
Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 528 A.2d 76 (N.J. 
Super. App. Div. 1987).  It held the word "sudden" is ambiguous-- 
sometimes carrying a temporal meaning and sometimes meaning 
"unexpected"--and should not be interpreted to exclude coverage 
for environmental harm caused by gradual discharges over a 
prolonged period.  It concluded, "[t]he pollution exclusion 
precludes coverage when the insured has caused the discharge of 
pollutants, unless the discharge was neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the insured."  Chemical Leaman 
Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. at 1157.  
The district court then granted partial summary judgment to the 
insurers with respect to soil damage because Chemical Leaman 
intended to discharge contaminants into the soil.  At trial, the 
jury found Chemical Leaman expected and intended discharges to 
the swamp, but not to the groundwater.  On appeal, the LMI 
contest their liability for groundwater damage. 
         Subsequent to the district court's decision, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court addressed the standard form pollution 
exclusion clause in Morton Intern., Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. 
Co., 629 A.2d at 847-76.  The New Jersey Supreme Court expressly 
overruled Broadwell, because it believed that the word "sudden" 
was not ambiguous.  It held "`sudden' possesses a temporal 
element, generally connoting an event that begins abruptly or 
without prior notice or warning," and concluded that "the phrase 
`sudden and accidental' in the standard pollution-exclusion 
clause describes only those discharges, dispersals, releases, and 
escapes of pollutants that occur abruptly or unexpectedly and are 
unintended."  Id. at 847.  Nevertheless, the court refused to 
enforce the standard pollution exclusion as written because it 
found the insurance industry had misled state regulators in 
securing its approval.  Instead, the court held the pollution 
exclusion clause precludes coverage if the insured intentionally 
discharges a known pollutant, regardless of whether the insured 
expected or intended to cause property damage: 
         [W]e perceive that regulators would 
         reasonably have understood the effect of the 
         clause to have denied coverage for the 
         intentional discharge, dispersal, release, or 
         escape of known pollutants, whether or not 
         the eventual damage was intended or expected 
         from the standpoint of the insured.  The 
         industry's presentation of the clause to 
         regulators described it as a clarification of 
         the "intended and expected" clause of the 
         basic "occurrence" definition "so as to avoid 
         any question of intent," and could fairly be 
         understood as an attempt to override the 
         issue whether damage was intended by 
         excluding coverage for intentional discharges 
         of known pollutants.  Accordingly, we 
         construe and give effect to the standard 
         pollution-exclusion clause only to the extent 
         that it shall preclude coverage for 
         pollution-caused property damage caused by an 
         "occurrence" if the insured intentionally 
         discharged, dispersed, released, or caused 
         the escape of a known pollutant. 
Id. at 848 (emphasis in the original). 
         On appeal, the LMI contend the district court 
incorrectly instructed the jury that the pollution exclusion 
clause precludes coverage only if Chemical Leaman intentionally 
discharged known pollutants into the groundwater.  First, the LMI 
argue Morton established that the word "sudden" has a temporal 
connotation--meaning "abrupt"--and precludes coverage for gradual 
discharges, dispersals, releases, or escapes.  Because Chemical 
Leaman discharged contaminated rinsewater over a prolonged 
period, they argue, coverage should be precluded.  The LMI 
acknowledge Morton's regulatory estoppel holding generally 
prevents enforcement of the "sudden" requirement, but assert 
Morton does not apply to the LMI because (1) several of their 
policies contain the non-standard NMA 1685 pollution exclusion, 
and (2), they were not party to the misrepresentations made to 
regulatory authorities.  Second, the LMI argue that even if 
Morton's regulatory estoppel holding applies, the pollution 
exclusion clause bars coverage because Chemical Leaman 
intentionally discharged known pollutants.  They argue the 
district court erred in requiring proof that Chemical Leaman 
intended discharge into the groundwater, as opposed to into the 
environment generally. 
                     A.  Regulatory Estoppel 
               1.  Non-Standard Pollution Exclusion 
         In Morton, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied 
regulatory estoppel to the ISO standard pollution exclusion 
clause and did not address coverage issues relating to non- 
standard pollution exclusion clauses.  Morton Intern., Inc. v. 
General Acc. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d at 881.  The LMI argue that 
Morton's regulatory estoppel holding should not prevent 
enforcement of the term "sudden" in the non-standard NMA 1685 
pollution exclusion clause contained in certain of their 
policies.  We believe this argument lacks merit.  Both the ISO 
standard pollution exclusion and the non-standard NMA 1685 
pollution exclusion use the term "sudden."  The NMA 1685 
exclusion closely tracks the language of the standard pollution 
exclusion, and both pollution exclusion clauses came into use at 
about the same time.  Indeed, the LMI argue the NMA 1685 
exclusion and the standard exclusion are identical in scope 
because both exclude coverage for non-abrupt, non-sudden 
discharges and releases of pollutants.  See also Potomac Elec. 
Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 968, 978 
n.23 (D.D.C. 1991) (defendant insurers admit there is "no 
material difference" between standard pollution exclusion and NMA 
1685 pollution exclusion).  The New Jersey Supreme Court refused 
to enforce the term "sudden" in Morton because the insurance 
industry mislead state regulators as to its effect when obtaining 
approval for the standard pollution exclusion clause.  We do not 
believe the New Jersey Supreme Court would enforce the term 
"sudden" in non-standard pollution exclusion clauses simply 
because other language in those clauses varies slightly from that 
in the standard pollution exclusion.  Therefore we conclude that 
Morton's regulatory estoppel holding applies to the NMA 1685 
pollution exclusion as well as the standard pollution exclusion. 
        2.  Application of Regulatory Estoppel to the LMI  
         The LMI also argue that Morton's regulatory estoppel 
holding should not be applied to them because they did not 
affirmatively deceive New Jersey regulators in securing approval 
of the standard pollution exclusion.  We cannot agree.  The LMI's 
policies contained the standard pollution exclusion precluding 
coverage for non-sudden discharges or releases of pollutants.  
They also contained the NMA 1685 pollution exclusion, which 
closely parallels the language of the standard exclusion.  
Approval of the standard pollution exclusion clause was secured 
through misrepresentations to regulatory authorities.  Regardless 
of whether the LMI themselves directly misrepresented the effect 
of the term "sudden" in the pollution exclusion clauses, they 
benefitted from the misleading explanation of the effect of the 
standard pollution exclusion submitted to state regulators by 
insurance industry trade groups.  The LMI did not independently 
submit information to New Jersey regulators or attempt to explain 
the full impact of the term "sudden" in the pollution exclusion 
clauses they used.  Under these circumstances, we believe the 
New Jersey Supreme Court would not enforce the term "sudden" in 
the policies issued by the LMI. 
                    B.  Intentional Discharge 
         The LMI also argue the district court should not have 
required separate findings with regard to intent to discharge 
into the soil, wetlands, and groundwater.  They contend that if 
Chemical Leaman intended any discharge, whether to the soil, 
groundwater, or wetlands, then the pollution exclusion clauses 
preclude coverage for all property damage arising from that 
discharge.  Because the district court granted partial summary 
judgment to the insurers with respect to discharges into the 
soil, the LMI argue, the district court should also have denied 
coverage for all resulting property damage, including groundwater 
damage.  The effect of the LMI's argument would be to require 
judgment in their favor as a matter of law on all policies 
containing a pollution exclusion.  The LMI raised this argument 
before the district court in a Rule 50(b) motion.  The district 
court refused to consider the argument because the LMI had not 
raised it in their prior Rule 50(a) motion.  Chemical Leaman Tank 
Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 89-1543, slip op. at 4 
(D.N.J. November 8, 1993). 
         Motions for judgment as a matter of law must be made 
before submission of the case to the jury and must "specify the 
judgment sought and the law and facts on which the moving party 
is entitled to judgment" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2).  We 
have reviewed the portions of the record cited to by the LMI in 
their brief, and conclude that the LMI did not specify the "law 
and facts" entitling them to judgment in their summary judgment 
motion, their Joint Trial Brief, or their Rule 50(a) motion 
before the district court.  The LMI assert they adequately raised 
the argument because they objected to the district court's jury 
instruction on the pollution exclusion clauses, stating: 
         There was one other thing with respect to the 
         pollution exclusion.  Just to be perfectly 
         clear.  It's not my understanding that the 
         law even where it does not recognize a 
         temporal element for the sudden.  It is not 
         required that there be an intent or an 
         expectation to discharge a particular medium, 
         rather it's the discharge itself and where it 
         goes.  This should not be the subject of the 
         deliberation of the jury. 
 
An objection to a jury charge can serve as a predicate for a 
later Rule 50(b) motion only if the district court explicitly 
treated the objection as a Rule 50(a) motion.  Bonjorno v. Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 814-15 (3d Cir. 1984) 
("A request for jury instructions may suffice to fulfill the 
requirement that a motion for a directed verdict be made before 
granting a JNOV only if it is clear the district court treated 
the request as a motion for a directed verdict and ruled on it as 
such."), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); Lowenstein v. Pepsi- 
Cola Bottling Co. of Pennsauken, 536 F.2d 9, 11 (3d Cir.) (same), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 966 (1976).  The district court did not 
treat the LMI's objection to the jury charge as a Rule 50(a) 
motion.  Accordingly, we believe the district court correctly 
declined to hear the LMI's argument on their Rule 50(b) motion. 
         "It is clear under our jurisprudence that this court 
cannot reverse the district court's decision denying [a] Rule 
50(b) motion for j.n.o.v. on the basis of an argument the [a 
party] failed to raise in support of its predicate Rule 50(a) 
motion for a directed verdict."  Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 
947 F.2d 1042, 1077 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 
(1992); see also Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco. Corp., 4 F.3d 
1153, 1172 (3d Cir. 1993) ("In order to preserve an issue for 
judgment pursuant to Rule 50(b), the moving party must timely 
move for judgement as a matter of law at the close of the 
nonmovant's case, pursuant to Rule 50(a), and specify the grounds 
for that motion.").  The LMI did not raise their argument in 
their Rule 50(a) motion.  Therefore we will not address it on 
appeal. 
         We believe the LMI's objection to the district court's 
jury instruction was also insufficient to preserve their argument 
for appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.  In order to preserve an 
objection to a jury instruction, a party must "object[] thereto 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the 
objection."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.  The purpose of Rule 51 is to 
"afford the trial judge an opportunity to correct the error in 
her charge before the jury retires to consider its verdict and to 
lessen the burden on appellate courts by diminishing the number 
of rulings at the trial which they may be called on to review."  
Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1379 (3d Cir.) (in banc), modified, 
13 F.3d 58, and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993).  We believe 
the LMI's objection did not identify the issue they now argue on 
appeal with sufficient clarity to give the trial judge notice of 
a possible error in the instruction.  Not only was the objection 
difficult to understand because of its convoluted grammar, but 
the objection did not specify the authority upon which it was 
based.  Therefore the LMI's objection failed to comply with Rule 
51's requirement that an objection "stat[e] distinctly . . . the 
grounds of the objection" and did not preserve the LMI's argument 
for appeal.  See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st 
Cir), ("Judges are not expected to be mindreaders.  Consequently, 
a litigant has an obligation to spell out its arguments squarely 
and distinctly, or else forever hold its peace."), cert. denied, 
494 U.S. 1082 (1990). 
         "In the absence of a party's preservation of an 
assigned error for appeal, we review for plain error, and our 
power to reverse is discretionary."  Fashauer v. New Jersey 
Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 57 F.3d 1269, 1289 (3d Cir. 1995).  
Particularly in the civil context, we exercise our power to 
reverse for plain error sparingly.  Id.; see also United States 
v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1188 (2d Cir. 1995) ("plain error review 
is only appropriate in the civil context where the error is so 
serious and flagrant that it goes to the very integrity of the 
trial."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 934 (1996).  Because we do not 
believe any mistake in the district court's jury instructions on 
the pollution exclusion clause was so fundamental as to amount to 
plain error, we decline to exercise our discretion to reverse.  
                     V.  Other-Site Evidence 
         Before trial, Chemical Leaman made a motion in limineto exclude 
evidence relating to environmental problems at other 
tank truck cleaning facilities it operated.  The district court 
granted this motion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because it 
found the probative value of the evidence substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, jury confusion, and 
undue waste of time.  Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 89-1543, slip op. at 4-5 (D.N.J. March 17, 
1993). 
         The LMI argue the district court abused it discretion 
in excluding evidence of environmental pollution at other 
Chemical Leaman cleaning facilities.  They contend the evidence 
from other sites tended to establish Chemical Leaman knew its 
system of unlined ponds at Bridgeport would cause property 
damage, including harm to the groundwater.  They also insist that 
such evidence should have been allowed to impeach the testimony 
of Harry Elston, the designer of all Chemical Leaman's waste 
treatment facilities, even if not allowed in their case-in-chief.  
We review the district court's rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence for an abuse of discretion.  See Tait v. Armor Elevator 
Co., 958 F.2d 563, 568 (3d Cir. 1992).  
         The district court noted the evidence the LMI sought to 
introduce had limited probative value because its relevance 
depended upon an extended chain of reasoning linking it to the 
Bridgeport site: 
         the jury would have to evaluate the various 
         explanations offered by Chemical Leaman on 
         why its knowledge of alleged problems at 
         other sites did not translate into an 
         expectation or intention that the rinsewater 
         treatment system in Bridgeport would cause 
         damage.  These explanations include, among 
         others, whether damage actually occurred at 
         the other sites; and whether the geological 
         and other conditions at the other sites were 
         significantly different or substantially the 
         same as at Bridgeport. . . . [T]he probative 
         value of the proffered other site evidence is 
         remote because it necessarily depends upon 
         these intermediate findings. 
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 
89-1543, slip op. at 4-5 (D.N.J. March 17, 1993). The district 
court believed that for the jury properly to evaluate this 
evidence, a series of mini-trials relating to each site would 
have been required.  Such mini-trials, the court concluded, would 
cause undue delay and mislead and confuse the jury as to the 
ultimate factual issue, namely Chemical Leaman's subjective 
intent to cause harm at the Bridgeport site.  Id.  Moreover, the 
district court held that the other site evidence carried with it 
a significant danger of unfair prejudice.  On the basis of such 
evidence, the court noted, the jury might have ignored New Jersey 
law on the insured's subjective intent and applied an objective 
test assessing whether "Chemical Leaman should have known that 
its rinsewater treatment system would cause damage."  Id. 
         In light of the district court's balancing of the 
probative value of the proffered evidence against its prejudicial 
effect and the potential for jury confusion and delay, we cannot 
say the district court abused its discretion in excluding the 
other site evidence. 
                     VI.  Continuous Trigger 
         The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the "continuous 
trigger" theory to identify the time of an "occurrence" in Owens- 
Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994).  The 
continuous trigger theory recognizes that "when progressive 
indivisible injury or damage results from exposure to injurious 
conditions for which civil liability may be imposed, courts may 
reasonably treat the progressive injury or damage as an 
occurrence within each of the years of a CGL policy."  Id. at 
995. 
         The conceptual underpinning of the 
         continuous-trigger theory, then, is that 
         injury occurs during each phase of 
         environmental contamination--exposure, 
         exposure in residence (defined as further 
         progression of environmental injury even 
         after exposure has ceased), and manifestation 
         of disease. 
Id. at 981.   
         In Owens-Illinois, the New Jersey Supreme Court also 
addressed the allocation of losses between multiple insurers and 
the insured when the continuous trigger theory establishes an 
occurrence in several different policy years.  It held "[a] fair 
method of allocation appears to be one that is related both to 
the time on the risk and the risk assumed," id. at 995, "i.e., 
proration on the basis of policy limits, multiplied by years of 
coverage," id. at 993. 
         Owens-Illinois involved a suit for personal injuries 
resulting from exposure to asbestos, but the New Jersey Supreme 
Court made clear the continuous trigger theory extends to 
property damage claims resulting from long-term environmental 
contamination.  It concluded, "[p]roperty-damage cases are 
analogous to the contraction of disease from exposure to toxic 
substances like asbestos.  Like a person exposed to toxic 
elements, the environment does not necessarily display the 
harmful effects until long after the initial exposure."  Id. at 
983; see also Astro Pak Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 665 
A.2d 1113, 1117 (N.J. Super. App. Div.) (same), certif. denied, 
670 A.2d 1065 (N.J. 1995). 
         Although considering the issue before the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's decision in Owens-Illinois, the district court 
applied the continuous trigger theory, ruling all of the LMI's 
policies from 1960 through 1985 had been triggered by the 
environmental contamination at the Bridgeport site, unless a 
policy exclusion barred coverage.  Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. at 1153-54.  The 
district court also held that all insurance policies activated by 
a continuing occurrence are jointly and severally liable to 
policy limits for property damage resulting from the occurrence.  
Id. 
         On appeal, the LMI contend the New Jersey Supreme Court 
would not recognize the continuous-trigger theory.  In light of 
the intervening decision in Owens-Illinois, this argument is 
meritless.  On the other hand, the LMI correctly dispute the 
district court's holding that all policies are jointly and 
severally liable under the continuous trigger theory.  Because 
the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected joint and several liability 
in favor of a risk-based allocation of liability among applicable 
insurance policies in Owens-Illinois, we will remand this matter 
to the district court for a reallocation of liability between the 
insurers and among the triggered policies in accordance with 
Owens-Illinois. 
         The LMI also contend that Chemical Leaman failed to 
prove property damage occurred during each policy year from 1960- 
70, and therefore the district court erred in finding as a matter 
of law that property damage occurred in the 1960-61 policy year, 
and in denying their summary judgement motion with respect to the 
1961-70 policy years.  Under the continuous trigger theory, 
exposure to the harm causing agent is sufficient to trigger 
potential coverage.  Actual manifestation of the injury is not 
required, so long as there is a continuous, indivisible process 
resulting in damage.  Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 
650 A.2d at 981 ("injury occurs during each phase of 
environmental contamination--exposure, exposure in residence . . 
. and manifestation of disease"); Morrone v. Harleysville Mut. 
Ins., 662 A.2d 562, 564 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1995) (exposure to 
gasoline sufficient to trigger occurrence).  It is undisputed 
that Chemical Leaman discharged contaminated rinsewater into the 
unlined ponds and lagoons in every year from 1960-70.  Moreover, 
the district court found as a factual matter that "contaminated 
rinsewater from the three settling ponds started migrating 
through the soil to underlying groundwater almost immediately 
after beginning pond operation in 1960."  Chemical Leaman Tank 
Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. at 1148.  
Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded as a matter 
of law that property damage occurred upon initial exposure in 
1960, and should have concluded as a matter of law that property 
damage occurred in each policy period from 1961-70.  The LMI, of 
course, were not prejudiced by the district court's error. 
         Finally, the LMI assert the district court incorrectly 
instructed the jury on the meaning of "property damage" in the 
underlying policies.  Specifically, they object to the 
instruction that "Chemical Leaman may be entitled to coverage 
under the defendants' insurance policies for property damage that 
occurs during a policy period, but that originally began during 
an earlier policy period."  They argue Chemical Leaman was 
required to prove "actual injury" during each policy period, and 
the jury incorrectly equated exposure to pollutants with property 
damage.  Under the continuous trigger theory, proof of actual 
injury in the sense of manifestation of injury is not required.  
The jury could find property damage occurred during a policy 
period so long as there is proof that a continuous, indivisible 
process of injury occurred during that period.  The district 
court's jury charge was not erroneous. 
                        VII.  Late Notice 
         Chemical Leaman failed notify its insurers of its claim 
relating to the Bridgeport facility until 1988, four years after 
it entered into a consent decree with the EPA admitting liability 
under CERCLA, and even longer after the underlying events that 
harmed the environment.  The LMI assert this failure violated the 
notice provisions of the policies and relieves them from any 
obligation to provide insurance coverage. 
         An insurer that seeks to disclaim coverage based upon 
untimely notice from its insured under an occurrence-based policy 
must demonstrate that it has suffered "appreciable prejudice."  
Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 870 (N.J. 
1968); Med. Inter Ins. Exchange v. Health Care Ins. Exchange, 651 
A.2d 1029, 1033 (N.J. Super. App. Div.), certif. denied, 658 A.2d 
728 (N.J. 1995).  Lower courts in New Jersey have identified two 
relevant factors in determining whether an insurer has suffered 
prejudice justifying a denial of coverage:  "whether substantial 
rights have been irretrievably lost by virtue of the failure of 
the insured to notify the carrier in a timely fashion," Morales 
v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 423 A.2d 325, 329 (N.J. Super. 
Law Div. 1980), and whether "the likelihood of success of the 
insurer in defending against the [underlying claim]" has been 
adversely affected, id. at 330.  Applying this two part test, the 
district court found the LMI had suffered no prejudice because 
material evidence had not been irretrievably lost, and no 
meritorious defense existed to Chemical Leaman's underlying 
liability under CERCLA.  Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1158-59 (D.N.J. 1993). 
         The LMI contend the district court erred in holding 
Chemical Leaman's contractual obligation to notify it of claims 
arose, at the earliest, in 1984.  They argue that obligation 
arose as much as twenty years earlier, when Chemical Leaman 
received complaints of environmental pollution from various 
regulatory bodies.  We disagree.  Chemical Leaman could not have 
known of the liabilities for which it seeks coverage until the 
EPA placed the Bridgeport site on the Superfund National 
Priorities List in 1984.  Prior New Jersey state actions against 
Chemical Leaman had sought only non-monetary injunctive relief.  
Because 1984 was the earliest practicable date by which Chemical 
Leaman could have given notice to the LMI, the LMI's assertions 
that potential valuable evidence was lost prior to 1984 are 
irrelevant.  While the LMI also argue that evidence was lost, and 
witnesses died, between 1984 and 1988, they have not disputed 
that "a wealth of relevant documentary evidence remains intact." 
Id. at 1159.  Moreover, the LMI had extensive opportunities to 
depose, and later cross-examine, Harry Elston, the designer of 
the Bridgeport site.  Accordingly, the district court correctly 
found that the LMI had not irretrievably lost any substantial 
right due to Chemical Leaman's untimely notice. 
         In addition, the LMI assert that Chemical Leaman's 
failure to give timely notice adversely affected their ability to 
defend against the underlying claim.  But the district court held 
no prejudice had resulted: 
         Chemical Leaman, as owner and operator of the 
         Bridgeport facility, is strictly liable under 
         CERCLA for damages for injury to, destruction 
         of, or loss of natural resources, as well as 
         for the reasonable costs of assessing such 
         damage to natural resources, and all costs of 
         removal, remediation, or other necessary 
         response costs.  Chemical Leaman's liability 
         for these damages is retroactive, joint, and 
         several, and imposed regardless of fault.  
         Defendants do not contend that a meritorious 
         challenge exists to the findings, made in the 
         1985 consent order . . . .  Nor do defendants 
         assert there is a meritorious defense to the 
         EPA's allegation that the presence of 
         hazardous substances at the Bridgeport 
         facility and their migration to surrounding 
         soils and groundwater constitute a release 
         within the meaning of section 101(22) of 
         CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.  9601(222).  Accordingly, 
         the court finds that defendants have not 
         shown a likelihood of success in defending 
         Chemical Leaman against claims under CERCLA. 
 
              Defendants also ask this court to find 
         that timely notice would have resulted in a 
         likelihood that the insurance carriers would 
         have reached a more favorable settlement.  
         However, defendants fail to demonstrate what 
         better arrangement the insurance carriers 
         would have been able to obtain if they had 
         assumed Chemical Leaman's defense upon timely 
         notice. 
Id.  On appeal, the LMI have not advanced any arguments that 
cause us to doubt the district court's conclusion. 
         Finally, the LMI question whether the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would apply the two part Morales test in 
determining whether an insurer has suffered appreciable 
prejudice.  But the LMI have not directed us to any New Jersey 
precedent that questions the vitality of Morales.  Accordingly, 
their contention lacks merit. 
                   VIII.  Discovery Misconduct 
         The LMI assert that Chemical Leaman willfully 
suppressed the identity of relevant witnesses and failed to 
produce certain documents.  After trial, the LMI moved for relief 
from the judgment and a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(3).  The district court denied the motion, 
although it believed a "close question" had been presented.  
After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we 
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the LMI's motion. 
                         IX.  Conclusion 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court except as to the allocation of liability among applicable 
policies.  We will remand to the district court for a 
reallocation of damages among applicable policies in accordance 
with the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in Owens-Illinois, 
650 A.2d at 993-95. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, and dissenting in part. 
 
         I must respectfully dissent from part III of the 
majority opinion because I do not agree with the majority's 
interpretation of Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident 
Ins. Co. of America 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 2764 (1994).  I believe Morton mandates an objective inquiry 
in disputes such as this.  Because the district court's jury 
instruction improperly focused on Chemical Leaman's subjective 
intent, I would remand this matter to the district court for 
retrial to determine if "exceptional circumstances" objectively 
established Chemical Leaman's intent to cause injury, and if so, 
whether the extent of the resulting injury was foreseeable.  
          I.  The Evolution of The "Intent" Analysis in 
                   "Occurrence-Based" Policies 
 
         Although the majority's analysis has much to commend 
it, I believe that a more thorough discussion of the evolution of 
New Jersey's law in this area is necessary to fully understand 
Morton.  An appreciation of the development of that law casts a 
different light upon the portions of Morton that control our 
analysis.    
 
         A. Atlantic Employers Ins. Co. v. Tots & Toddlers Pre-  
                 School Day Care Center, Inc. 
 
         Our analysis must begin with, and be guided by a 
discussion of Atlantic Employers, because it used language that 
the court would later cite and which I believe has caused my 
colleagues to take an incorrect analytical turn.  In Atlantic 
Employers, parents of children who had been sexually abused sued 
the owners and operators of a day care center where the abuse 
purportedly took place.  The company that insured the center then 
brought a declaratory judgment action to determine its obligation 
to defend or indemnify the owners for any recovery the plaintiffs 
might win in their personal injury suits based upon negligence 
and intentional tort.  
         The day care center's insurance policy insured against 
damage resulting from an "occurrence."  An "occurrence" included 
injury or damage that was "neither expected nor intended by the 
insured."  Atlantic Employers, 571 A.2d at 303.  The policy also 
contained an exclusion for violations of penal statutes or 
ordinances.  The Appellate Division first noted the general rule 
that "coverage does exist . . . 'for the unintended results of an 
intentional act, but not for damages assessed because of an 
injury intended to be inflicted.'"  Id. (citation omitted).  The 
court stated:   
                    There seems to be no dispute that if . . . 
                    Robert Knighton sexually molested the 
                    children, then he had the requisite level of 
                    intent to be found guilty of sexual 
                    molestation, based on the criminal statutes 
                    of this State.  But appellants insist that 
                    this does not necessarily mean that he 
                    intended the damages or injuries incurred by 
                    the children as a result of such actions. . . 
                    .  Further, they insist that the existence of 
                    such intent cannot automatically be imputed 
                    to the other insureds under the policy so as 
                    to exclude coverage. . . .  We reject this 
                    position. 
                     
          Id.  The court then examined cases from other jurisdictions in 
order to analyze the insureds' argument in context with 
developing law.  The court noted that some jurisdictions employed 
a subjective test in determining insurance coverage under these 
circumstances, and some relied upon an objective test.  The court 
concluded that public policy mandated an objective approach. 
                   As a matter of public policy 
              and logic we conclude that the 
              better rule warrants application of 
              the objective approach. A 
              subjective test suggests that it is 
              possible to molest a child and not 
              cause some kind of injury, an 
              unacceptable conclusion. . . .  
                   . . . It is simply against 
              public policy to indemnify a person 
              for a loss incurred as a result of 
              his[/her] own willful wrongdoing. 
 
Id. at 304.  Thus, the court held that policy, as well as logic, 
required an "objective approach" as an exception to the general 
rule.   
B. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Karlinski 
         Within a year and a half of Atlantic Employers, the 
Appellate Division decided Karlinski.  There, insured's 13-year 
old son (James) had engaged in a prearranged fight with a 14-year 
old (Mark) in which Mark had fallen and suffered a broken hip.  
The court was asked to determine if a homeowner's policy 
obligated the plaintiff insurer to defend and indemnify the 
defendant.  The policy excluded coverage for "'bodily injury . . 
. which is expected or intended by the insured.'"  Karlinski, 598 
A.2d at 919.  The motion court granted the insurer's motion for 
summary judgment noting that the son of the insured "'instigated 
the fight and threw the first blow and started the fight.  As far 
as I am concerned, it is intentional conduct and the coverage 
doesn't apply.'"  Id.  The motion judge also concluded that "a 
broken 'leg' [Mark actually suffered a broken hip] was not an 
extraordinary consequence of the fight."  Id.   
         On appeal the court aptly noted, "[t]he appeal requires 
that we again explore the frequently visited but still unclearly 
charted area of liability coverage for intentional torts which 
produce unintended results." Id.  The court went on to observe: 
                   Our review of New Jersey 
              authorities satisfies us that . . . 
              it is difficult to  ascertain a 
              clear weight of authority on the 
              subject of liability insurance 
              coverage for unintended results of 
              intentional acts. Differing 
              combinations of variables, such as 
              the language of the exclusion 
              clause, the nature of the harm and 
              its relationship to the intentional 
              act, and the availability of relief 
              to the injured party, appear to 
              influence the extent to which our 
              decisions have inquired into the 
              nature of the intent. 
 
Id. at 921.  The court then stated:  
              [W]e hold that, when a coverage 
              exclusion is expressed in terms of 
              bodily injury expected or intended 
              by the insured, and where the 
              intentional act does not have an 
              inherent probability of causing the 
              degree of injury actually 
              inflicted, a factual inquiry into    
              the actual intent of the actor to 
              cause that injury is necessary. 
Id.   
          
         C. Voorhees v. Preferred Mutual Ins. Co. 
         In Voorhees, a parent was sued for statements she had 
made  at a public meeting where she had questioned the competency 
of her child's teacher.  The teacher claimed she had suffered 
emotional distress and mental anguish as a result of the parent's 
conduct.  The teacher alleged that the parent had acted 
"willfully, deliberately, recklessly and negligently," in making 
false accusations that had damaged the teacher professionally, 
and subjected her to public ridicule.  Voorhees, 607 A.2d at 
1257.  Medical evidence established that the emotional distress 
the teacher complained of had resulted in "'an undue amount of 
physical complaints,' including 'headaches, stomach pains, 
nausea, . . . [and] body pains.'"  Id. at 1258.  
         The parent had a homeowner's policy that provided 
coverage for liability arising from "bodily injury" caused by an 
"occurrence."  The policy defined an "occurrence" as an 
"accident," and excluded coverage for bodily injury intentionally 
caused by the insured.  The insurer relied upon this language and 
refused to defend the insured against the teacher's suit, 
asserting that the claims were based on the insured's intentional 
act and that the complaint sought damages for a "personal" rather 
than a "bodily" injury.  The parent eventually sued her carrier 
for damages resulting from its refusal to provide a defense and 
indemnify her.  Both parties moved for summary judgment. 
         The trial court granted the insurer's motion ruling 
that the complaint did not allege the kind of "bodily injury" 
that would be covered under the policy.  A divided panel of the 
Appellate Division reversed. 
         The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the duty to 
defend under the policy was not triggered "absent a potentially- 
coverable occurrence."  Id. at 1262.  In assessing whether the 
insured's statements constituted a potentially coverable 
occurrence, the court first held that "the accidental nature of 
an occurrence is determined by analyzing whether the alleged 
wrongdoer intended or expected to cause an injury."  Id. at 1264.  
As to what constitutes an "intent to injure," the court noted 
that the general trend in the law appeared to require an inquiry 
into the actor's subjective intent to cause injury:   
                   We adhere to the prevalent New 
              Jersey rule and hold that the 
              accidental nature of an occurrence 
              is determined by analyzing whether 
              the alleged wrongdoer intended or 
              expected to cause an injury.  If 
              not, then the resulting injury is 
              "accidental," even if the act that 
              caused the injury was intentional.  
              That interpretation prevents those 
              who intentionally cause harm from 
              unjustly benefitting from insurance 
              coverage while providing injured 
              victims with the greatest chance of 
              compensation consistent with the 
              need to deter wrong-doing.  It also 
              accords with an insured's 
              objectively-reasonable expectation 
              of coverage for 
              unintentionally-caused harm. 
                   Even if the operative question 
              is the intent to injure rather than 
              to act, the question of what 
              constitutes an "intent to injure" 
              remains.  The key issue is whether 
              the court must find a subjective 
              intent to injure, or whether it can 
              presume an intent to injure from 
              the objective circumstances.  In 
              that regard, our inquiry parallels 
              that taken in interpreting policy 
              exclusions for intentional acts.  
              Those exclusions preclude coverage 
              for injuries expected or intended 
              by the insured.  Case law 
              interpreting those policy 
              exclusions, in addition to that 
              interpreting the definition of 
              "occurrence," is thus relevant. 
                   The general trend appears to 
              require an inquiry into the actor's 
              subjective intent to cause injury.  
              Even when the actions in question 
              seem foolhardy and reckless, the 
              courts have mandated an inquiry 
              into the actor's subjective intent 
              to cause injury. 
 
Id. at 1264. 
         The court, however, recognized that: 
                   When the actions are 
              particularly reprehensible, the 
              intent to injure can be presumed 
              from the act without an inquiry 
              into the actor's subjective intent 
              to injure.  That objective approach 
              focuses on the likelihood that an 
              injury will result from an actor's 
              behavior rather than on the 
              wrongdoer's subjective state of 
              mind. 
Id. at 1265.  The Voorhees court reasoned that the insured's 
actions there were a far cry from the type of egregious behavior 
that had justified an objective approach in Atlantic Employers.  
The court held that "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances that 
objectively establish the insured's intent to injure," the 
insured's subjective intent to injure must govern.  Id.  The 
Voorhees court's reference to "exceptional circumstances" was 
clearly intended to recognize the need for an objective test in 
the specific circumstances it confronted in Atlantic Employers, 
and it foreshadowed the test it would proclaim in Morton. 
         Although the court in Voorhees felt that there was 
little evidence of a subjective intent to injure the teacher, the 
court never had to address this question because the plaintiff 
had also alleged that the insured had acted negligently.  The 
allegation of negligence presupposed the absence of a subjective 
intent to injure and stated a claim for a potentially coverable 
occurrence thus triggering the insurer's duty to defend.  See Id.  
Accordingly, the court affirmed plaintiff's award of summary 
judgment.    
         D. SL Industries, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co. 
         In SL Industries, an employee had filed suit against 
his employer alleging age discrimination and common law fraud as 
a result of the employer eliminating his position.  The employee 
sought recovery for the alleged bodily injury that resulted.  The 
employer was insured under a policy in which the insurer agreed 
to defend and indemnify the employer for all sums resulting from 
a bodily injury caused by an "occurrence."  "Occurrence" was 
defined as an "'accident . . . which results in bodily injury . . 
. neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the 
insured.'"  SL Industries, 607 A.2d at 1269-70. 
         The employer settled the suit and then brought a 
declaratory judgment action against its insurer to establish its 
right to indemnification.  The Law Division granted the insurer 
summary judgment, but the Appellate Division reversed, holding 
that although intended harm was not covered under the policy, the 
policy did provide coverage for the unforeseen results of 
intentional conduct.  The court then remanded the case to the Law 
Division to determine whether the employee's emotional distress 
had been intended or whether it was foreseeable.  
         On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court had to 
determine if the general intent to injure that is inherent in a 
claim of fraud necessarily incorporates the intent to cause the 
specific injury  (emotional distress), or whether proof of a 
subjective intent to cause the specific injury is required.  Id.at 1277-
1279.  The court began its analysis of the required 
intent by examining the differing approaches taken by earlier 
cases.         
                   Our courts have taken 
              different approaches to the 
              question of how specifically the 
              insured must have intended the 
              resulting injury.  Employing the 
              "Lyons" test, some courts have 
              held that a subjective intent to 
              injure ends the inquiry and 
              precludes coverage.  Under that 
              approach, if there is a subjective 
              intent to injure then any injury 
              that results from the action will 
              be deemed "intentional," even if 
              the injury is different from or 
              greater than that intended. . . . 
                   On the other hand, some courts 
              have indicated that to preclude 
              coverage if the injury that 
              actually occurred was not a 
              probable outcome of the wrongful 
              act is unfair [discussing 
              Karlinski]. . . . However, in those 
              circumstances in which the facts 
              indicate that the acts in which the 
              insured engaged were unlikely to 
              result in the degree or type of 
              injury that in fact occurred, an 
              inquiry into the subjective intent 
              to cause the resulting injury is in 
              order. 
                   A third approach is even more 
              likely to lead to coverage.  In 
              Hanover Insurance Group v. Cameron, 
              the court rejected the insurance 
              company's argument that to preclude 
              coverage only the intent to harm 
              need be demonstrated.  The court 
              indicated that "intent" would only 
              be found when the actual 
              consequences that resulted from the 
              act were intended, or when the 
              actor was substantially certain 
              they would result.  
                   To determine which approach to 
              adopt, we refer to the general 
              principles underlying the 
              interpretation of insurance-policy 
              provisions involving intentional 
              conduct.   
                   The Lyons test . . . precludes 
              coverage in some cases in which an 
              insured could reasonably expect 
              coverage.  When the injury caused 
              significantly exceeds the injury 
              intended or expected and is an 
              improbable consequence of the 
              wrongful act that caused it, then 
              it is hard to characterize the 
              injury as truly 'intentional.'  The 
              injury, from the standpoint of the 
              insured, is 'accidental,' and could 
              thus be deemed an occurrence.  
              Moreover, if the tortfeasor did not 
              intend or expect to cause the 
              resulting harm, denying coverage 
              will not deter the harmful conduct.  
              In that case, there is no policy 
              justification for denying the 
              victim the possibility of 
              additional compensation.  As the 
              Karlinski court noted, precluding 
              coverage 'even if the actual harm 
              far exceed[s] the consequences 
              which might reasonably be expected 
              by the insured . . .  diminishes 
              the injured party's realistic 
              possibility of recovery more than 
              it impacts upon the insured 
              tortfeasor.'  
                   On the other hand, an approach 
              allowing coverage whenever the 
              adverse consequences intended by 
              the tortfeasor did not precisely 
              match the actual consequences of 
              their wrongful actions undermines 
              the basic policy against 
              indemnifying wrongdoers. 
                   We believe the Karlinski test 
              presents the most reasonable 
              approach. . . .  Assuming the 
              wrongdoer subjectively intends or 
              expects to cause some sort of 
              injury, that intent will generally 
              preclude coverage.  If there is 
              evidence that the extent of the 
              injuries was improbable, however, 
              then the court must inquire as to 
              whether the insured subjectively 
              intended or expected to cause that 
              injury.  Lacking that intent, the 
              injury was 'accidental' and 
              coverage will be provided. 
                                               
Id. at 1277-78 (citations omitted). 
         Accordingly, the court affirmed the Appellate 
Division's judgment remanding the case to the Law Division to 
determine whether the employee's emotional distress had been a 
probable outcome of the insured's general intent to injure, and 
if not, whether the insured had the subjective intent to injure 
the employee.  See Id. at 1279.       
         E. Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. 
Co.                  
         Finally, in Morton, the New Jersey Supreme Court had to 
apply the law of "occurrence-based" insurance policies to the 
very different realm of injuries to the environment.  There, the 
insured, Morton International, sued primary and excess CGL 
insurers seeking reimbursement for costs incurred in defending a 
suit filed by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), 
as well as indemnity for cleanup and remediation expenses 
resulting from the DEP proceeding.  Morton, 629 A.2d at 834-835.  
Morton's predecessors, including Ventron Corporation, had 
polluted a body of water known as Berry's Creek to such an extent 
that "[f]or a stretch of several thousand feet, the concentration 
of mercury in Berry's Creek [was] the highest found in fresh 
water sediments in the world."  Id. at 834.  Morton's claims were 
derived from Ventron as well as other prior owners of the land.  
See Id..  The DEP sued Ventron and other prior owners to compel 
them to pay for remediating the pollution of Berry's Creek and 
the surrounding area.  The environmental damage had been caused 
by discharges from a mercury-processing plant operated for forty 
years by the various defendants.  See New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 
1983).   
         In the underlying suit to establish liability, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment 
holding the defendants jointly and severally liable.  The court 
reasoned that the discharge of mercury constituted an abnormally 
dangerous activity, and imposed strict liability against all 
defendants. See Id. at 160.      
         Morton then commenced a declaratory judgment action to 
determine its right to indemnification from the various insurers 
that had provided primary and excess coverage while the mercury- 
processing plant was in operation.  The primary issue that the 
court had to determine was whether the pollution resulted from an 
"occurrence" under the applicable policies.  To qualify as an 
"occurrence" the environmental damage must not have been 
"expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."  
Morton, 629 A.2d at 836.  The trial court granted the insurer's 
motion for summary judgment.  The Appellate Division reversed 
holding that the trial court had "focused improperly on the 
manner in which the injury had been caused and had erroneously 
concluded that the policy did not provide coverage for the 
unexpected result of a deliberate act."  Id. at 877 (citation 
omitted). 
         The Appellate Division also relied upon Atlantic 
Employers to conclude that "'[t]he intentional character of the 
act is the basis for the inference that the insured either 
intended or was manifestly indifferent to the prospect of 
injury.'"  Id.  (citation omitted).  In reaching this conclusion, 
the Appellate Division (without the benefit of either Voorhees or 
SL Industries) noted that the "'substantial environmental 
pollution over a long period'" together with the knowledge by 
Morton's predecessors that "'the substance being discharged . . . 
was toxic and harmful'" rendered unacceptable a conclusion that 
no harm had been expected."  Id.  (citation omitted).   
         On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, Morton 
argued that the Appellate Division's reliance on Atlantic 
Employers improperly equated the discharge of pollutants with 
child molestation as acts that could be deemed intentionally 
injurious as a matter of law.  Morton further argued that "the 
Appellate Division improperly invoked an objective standard for 
determining whether harm had been intended or expected under the 
`occurrence'-based policies, ignoring the long-standing principle 
that coverage exists for the unintended results of intentional 
acts."  Id. 
         The court began its analysis by acknowledging the 
unique circumstances that surround issues of insurance coverage 
for environmental damage.  
                   In applying our holding in 
              Voorhees to claims seeking coverage 
              for property-damage caused by 
              environmental pollution under 
              occurrence-based CGL policies, we 
              acknowledge the impracticality of 
              adherence to the general rule that 
              "we will look to the insured's 
              subjective intent to determine 
              intent to injure."  Although 
              insureds may concede that 
              pollutants -- even known pollutants 
              -- had been intentionally 
              discharged, those insureds are 
              virtually certain to insist that 
              the resultant harm was unintended 
              and unexpected.  Absent "smoking 
              gun" testimony from a disgruntled 
              employee, proof of subjective 
              intent to cause environmental harm 
              will rarely be available in 
              [environmental insurance] coverage 
              litigation.   
                   We noted in Voorhees that an 
              alternative to proof of subjective 
              intent to injure existed in those 
              cases in which the insured's 
              "actions are particularly 
              reprehensible, [so that] the intent 
              to injure can be presumed from the 
              act without an inquiry into the 
              actor's subjective intent to 
              injure."  We cited Atlantic 
              Employers . . . as illustrative of 
              conduct that was so inherently 
              injurious as to warrant the 
              conclusion that intent to injure 
              could be presumed. . . .  We are 
              unpersuaded that 
              environmental-pollution litigation 
              should generally be included in 
              that category of cases, typified by 
              Atlantic Employers, in which 
              reprehensible conduct justifies a 
              presumption that injury was 
              intended.   
 
Id. at 879 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).   
         Instead of relying upon such an unwarranted presumption 
and thereby extending the  "public policy and logic" of Atlantic 
Employers, the court called for an individualized inquiry based 
upon the facts of each case.  
              [I]nsureds held responsible for 
              remediation of environmental 
              pollution vary significantly in 
              their degree of culpability for the 
              harm caused by pollutant 
              discharges.  A general rule in 
              environmental-pollution coverage 
              litigation that would permit intent 
              to injure to be presumed simply on 
              the basis of a knowing discharge of 
              pollutants would be unjustified. 
                   Instead, we hold that in 
              environmental-coverage litigation a 
              case-by-case analysis is required 
              in order to determine whether, in 
              the context of all the available 
              evidence, "exceptional 
              circumstances [exist] that 
              objectively establish the insured's 
              intent to injure."   
 
 
Id. at 879-80 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  The term 
"exceptional circumstances" had been used in Voorhees.  As noted 
above, there, the court stated that, absent exceptional 
circumstances, the subjective intent of the insured controlled 
whether there was an "occurrence" under an occurrence-based 
insurance policy.  In Voorhees, the court had stated that it was 
adopting the majority view that requires proof of a 
transgressor's subjective intent.  Voorhees at 607 A.2d at 1255. 
         The court, however, had also noted that "[w]hen the 
actions are particularly reprehensible, the intent to injure can 
be presumed from the act without an inquiry into the actor's 
subjective intent to injure." Id. at 1265.  In the context of 
Atlantic Employers, the reprehensible actions of child 
molestation did indeed "'[a]s a matter of public policy and logic 
. . . warrant[] application of the objective approach.'" Id.   
Then, the court used the language that separates me from my 
colleagues.  The court added: "[a]bsent exceptional circumstancesthat 
objectively establish the insured's intent to injure, we 
will look to the insured's subjective intent to determine intent 
to injure." Id. (emphasis added). 
           III.  Morton Applied to the Instant Dispute 
         In Morton, the court was careful to distinguish the 
policy considerations in pollution coverage cases from those that 
dictated an objective approach in all cases of child molestation. 
"We are unpersuaded that environmental-pollution litigation 
should generally be included in that category of cases, typified 
by Atlantic Employers, in which reprehensible conduct justifies a 
presumption that injury was intended." Morton, 629 A.2d at 879. 
This does not mean, as the majority suggests, that the alleged 
polluter's subjective intent controlled. It only means that the 
act of polluting is not so reprehensible that "public policy and 
logic" require a presumption that the resulting harm is intended 
as a matter of law. Rather, the circumstances surrounding the act 
of polluting must be examined in each case to determine if, in 
that particular situation, they objectively establish an intent 
to harm the environment, thereby negating an occurrence.   
         The court then listed those circumstances that would 
objectively establish this intent. 
              Those circumstances include the 
              duration of the discharges, whether 
              the discharges occurred 
              intentionally, negligently, or 
              innocently, the quality of the 
              insured's knowledge concerning the 
              harmful propensities of the 
              pollutants, whether regulatory 
              authorities attempted to discourage 
              or prevent the insured's conduct, 
              and the existence of subjective 
              knowledge concerning the 
              possibility or likelihood of harm.  
 
Id. at 880.  Accordingly, I cannot agree when my colleagues 
state, "[w]e believe the New Jersey Supreme Court designed the 
'exceptional circumstances' exception to apply only to egregious 
conduct." Majority Op. at 27.  One can only determine if conduct 
is egregious by examining the "exceptional circumstances" in 
which it occurred.  Indeed, an examination of those circumstances 
may well establish that a particular polluter's conduct was not 
egregious at all.  
         The majority's error is reflected in what the court in 
Morton did.  It did not require proof of the subjective intent to 
pollute on the part of the insured or its predecessors.  Rather, 
it examined the record and determined that the circumstances 
before it objectively established an intent to harm. "In 
determining whether in the context of this record the trial court 
properly concluded, as a matter of law, that Morton's 
predecessors had intended or expected environmental injury, we 
focus on those factors [i.e. the "exceptional circumstances"] 
that we previously have identified to be significant." Morton, 
629 A.2d at 882. The court then noted the duration of the 
discharge, the intentional nature of the discharge, the insured's 
knowledge of the likely environmental harm, and the history of 
"stonewalling."  In conclusion, the court noted that its 
examination of these circumstances confirmed that "damage 
qualitatively comparable to that found to exist . . . must have 
been anticipated by Morton's predecessors on the basis of . . . 
prolonged knowledge of and avoidance of compliance with 
complaints by regulatory officials." Id. at 884. 
         This is consistent with the court's pronouncement that 
the mere fact of polluting, even to the egregious extent present 
in Morton, was not by itself, such reprehensible conduct that it 
required a conclusive presumption of an intent to harm.  
Moreover, the "exceptional circumstances" include "the existence 
of subjective knowledge concerning the possibility or likelihood 
of harm."  However, subjective knowledge is not used to 
definitively determine if the insured expected or intended 
environmental damage.  Rather, the insured's subjective knowledge 
is but one of those "exceptional circumstances" that determine if 
an "occurrence" has taken place. It is not the start and finish 
of that inquiry as the majority's reasoning suggests.  
         The Morton court concluded that exceptional 
circumstances established as a matter of law that there had been 
no occurrence as Morton's predecessors had to have expected the 
pollution they caused.  The objective nature of this conclusion 
is evident because the court clearly stated that is was not 
deciding whether Morton's predecessors "intended" (i.e. 
"subjectively") the damage: 
              Without determining that such 
              damage was intended, we find 
              inescapable the conclusion that 
              damage qualitatively comparable to 
              that found to exist in the Ventron 
              litigation must have been 
              anticipated by Morton's 
              predecessors on the basis of their 
              prolonged knowledge of and 
              avoidance of compliance with 
              complaints by regulatory officials 
              that the company was discharging 
              unacceptable emissions, including 
              mercury compounds, into Berry's 
              Creek.  Based on that conclusion,. 
              . . as a matter of law the property 
              damage to Berry's Creek and the 
              surrounding area was not caused by 
              an "occurrence" within the meaning 
              of the term in the various CGL 
              policies.  
 
Id. at 884 (emphasis added). 
         In adopting prior law (particularly the holding in 
Karlinski) to environmental insurance coverage, the court in 
Morton noted that subjective evidence of the polluter's intent 
did not become relevant merely because the extent of pollution 
was greater than anticipated.  
                   Turning to the question 
              whether environmental injury was 
              intended or expected, we first 
              observe that although the magnitude 
              of the damage to Berry's Creek and 
              the surrounding areas may exceed 
              any intention or expectation 
              attributable to Morton's 
              predecessors, we do not consider 
              that differences in harm relating 
              to the severity of environmental 
              damage give rise to a finding of 
              "improbability" of harm that 
              invokes the need for evidence of 
              subjective intent.  Whether 
              Morton's predecessors anticipated 
              that discharges of untreated 
              effluent on the plant site and into 
              Berry's Creek for more than forty 
              years would cause environmental 
              harm of the severity described . . 
              . hardly demonstrates that the 
              extent of the injury was 
              "improbable."  The holding in SL 
              Industries was based on the 
              Appellate Division's ruling in 
              Karlinski, that in a coverage 
              action arising from a fight between 
              two young teenagers in which one 
              sustained a broken hip, a factual 
              issue of subjective intent was 
              presented because of the inherent 
              improbability that the skirmish 
              would result in a hip fracture.  No 
              such inherent "improbability" can 
              be ascribed to the environmental 
              damage attributable to Morton's 
              predecessors. 
 
Id. at 882 (citations omitted).   
         The majority notes that the district court held that  
                    Chemical Leaman's actions were not so 
                    reprehensible as to justify the presumption 
                    of an intent to cause property damage under 
                    the "exceptional circumstances" exception. It 
                    concluded that Chemical Leaman was not 
                    "throwing toxic waste out into the meadow- 
                    lands" as Morton and its predecessors had 
                    done; rather, it had "designed and built the 
                    facility to prevent [harm to the 
                    environment]." 
          Majority Op. at 20. (emphasis added).  The "exceptional 
circumstances" test, however, is not an "exception," but the rule 
that is to be applied in environmental coverage cases.  In 
addition, although Chemical Leaman was not reducing Berry Creek 
to one of the world's great environmental disasters as was the 
case in Morton, there is nevertheless testimony from which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that "exceptional circumstances" 
objectively establish Chemical Leaman's intent to harm the 
environment.  
         The majority holds that after Morton, a court can 
determine that an insured is entitled to indemnification under an 
occurrence-based policy as a matter of law absent "exceptional 
circumstances." My colleagues suggest that "exceptional 
circumstances" merely 
                    define when no reasonable jury could find the 
                    insured did not intend or expect to cause 
                    property damage because objective 
                    circumstances--evidence of prolonged, 
                    intentional, or flagrant discharges of known 
                    pollutants in the face of regulatory 
                    disapproval--establish that the insured must 
                    have intended property damage.  The presence 
                    of "exceptional circumstances" requires a 
                    court to enter judgment as a matter of law.  
                    Their absence, of course, does not prevent a 
                    jury from finding an insured "expected" or 
                    "intended" to cause property damage. 
           
See Majority Op. at n.7. However, Morton did not quantify the 
factors it identified as objectively establishing intent to 
pollute.  Rather, the "case-by-case analysis" was necessary for 
the fact finder to make an individualized determination of 
whether the nature of those factors in a particular case 
justified denying coverage in lieu of the limitations contained 
in the insurance contract.  Thus, I agree that the absence of the 
factors detailed at footnote 7 of the majority opinion "doe[] not 
prevent a jury from finding an insured 'expected' or 'intended' 
to cause property damage," but not for the reason stated by the 
majority. Rather, it is because "subjective knowledge concerning 
the possibility or likelihood of harm" is one of the "exceptional 
circumstances" that a jury must also consider. Accordingly, if an 
insured knows that its actions will most likely harm the 
environment, just one, brief, discharge of a known pollutant by 
one who had otherwise complied with regulatory authorities could 
preclude coverage under an occurrence-based insurance policy.  
         The majority argues that Morton cannot be read as 
creating an objective test for intent because an insured who 
"intentional[ly] discharges a known pollutant generally intends 
'some sort of harm,' however de minimis, and the harm that 
actually results is usually a probable result of the discharge." 
Thus, (the majority suggests) an objective test "would result in 
a general rule precluding [all] coverage based on the knowing 
discharge of a pollutant."  Majority Op. at 23.  That is, 
however, precisely why it is necessary to use "exceptional 
circumstances" to prove intent to harm objectively in pollution 
cases. If the resulting inquiry establishes that the insured did 
objectively "intend" to harm the environment, the inquiry into 
the foreseeability of the actual damage makes perfect sense.   
         The majority expresses a further concern that reading 
Morton to require anything other than subjective intent "would be 
akin to a negligence standard [,and] [i]f negligent acts did not 
fall within the definition of a covered occurrence, then there 
would be no point in purchasing comprehensive general liability 
insurance." Majority Op. at 18 (citing Pittston Co. v. Allianz 
Ins. Co., 905 F. Supp. 1279, 1301 (D.N.J. 1995)). A properly 
guided inquiry into "exceptional circumstances," however, does 
not equate with a negligence standard.  It assigns the cost of 
environmental remediation not based upon negligence, but upon the 
"degree of culpability for the harm caused by pollutant 
discharges."  Morton, 629 A.2d at 879.  
    IV. The Exceptional Circumstances of The Bridgeport Site. 
         Throughout the time the pond and lagoon system was in 
use there were repeated discharges of waste through the overflow 
pipe to the adjacent swamp.  In fact, the very purpose of the 
overflow pipe was to allow for these discharges.  An Inspector 
observed the discharge from the last pond during a September 12, 
1961 visit and thereafter observed similar discharges on about 
half of his visits to the Bridgeport site.  In November 1968, 
water pollution inspectors from the New Jersey Department of 
Health again observed the discharge from the overflow pipe in the 
last lagoon.  Although it was characterized as a sporadic 
"trickle", an engineer employed by Chemical Leaman (Elston), and 
at least one other employee admitted that the overflow pipe did 
discharge into the swamp throughout the time the pond and lagoon 
system was in use.  Moreover, there was evidence that by 1974, 
the path of this "trickle" from the last impoundment could "be 
easily seen by looking for a 75-foot wide lane of dead trees" in 
the swamp. 
         The Morton court concluded that the discharge of 
pollutants there was intentional once the polluters knew it was 
unacceptable.  Morton, 629 A.2d at 882.  There, the repeated 
demands of the Department of Health that the owner halt the 
discharges or install adequate treatment facilities were 
regularly ignored. Id.  Here, the intentional nature of the 
discharge is also evident.  Chemical Leaman intentionally 
designed its waste treatment system so that the overflow pipe 
would discharge into the swamp.  Furthermore, even under the 
subjective framework that the jury was given to review the 
evidence, it concluded that Chemical Leaman's releases were 
intentional.  That conclusion is supported by the record and 
Chemical Leaman cannot now successfully argue that the discharges 
were anything but intentional.  Indeed, Chemical Leaman's denials 
illustrate the concern expressed in Morton that a polluter may 
admit to the discharge, but would never admit to intentionally 
polluting the environment.  That concern could only be 
satisfactorily addressed by the objective test that the majority 
today rejects. 
         Here, as in Morton, the intentional nature of the 
discharge is confirmed by Chemical Leaman's continued evasion of 
the State's demands to stop the discharge.  The unacceptable 
condition of the discharge from the overflow pipe into the swamp 
was brought to Chemical Leaman's attention by a governmental 
inspector in September of 1961.  Although Chemical Leaman 
installed three more lagoons in an attempt to alleviate this 
situation, the overflow pipe remained a staple of the Bridgeport 
site and in 1968, Chemical Leaman was still discharging wastes 
into the lagoon.   
         State officials regularly informed Chemical Leaman that 
the effluent flowing from the overflow pipe constituted an 
unacceptable discharge into the swamp.  In 1961, FGW told 
Chemical Leaman that the discharge was an unacceptable condition 
and that the resulting pollution should be stopped within a year.  
Subsequently, in 1968, the NJDOH told Chemical Leaman that "the 
waste emanating from the lagoon is highly pollutional and [that] 
immediate measures [should] be taken to eliminate this discharge 
or to sufficiently treat the waste prior to discharge" and in 
1969, Chemical Leaman was ordered to find an alternative method 
of waste treatment.   
         Chemical Leaman argues that it was not aware of the 
harmful propensities of its pollutants because it was not 
discharging pure chemicals, but rather "trace amounts" of these 
chemicals in highly diluted rinsewater.  The uncontroverted 
evidence, however, clearly showed that at least by 1968, Chemical 
Leaman was alerted that the discharge into the swamp was "highly 
pollutional" even in its diluted form.  Furthermore, as noted 
above, however diluted the discharge may have been, it was 
sufficiently potent to sculpt the 75-foot wide path of dead trees 
into the environmental landscape it touched. 
         It is certainly true that Chemical Leaman is more 
sympathetic than the polluters in Morton, who engaged in a 
deliberate pattern of "stonewalling" characterized by promises of 
compliance that went unfulfilled.  Morton, 629 A.2d at 882.  As 
the majority notes, Chemical Leaman apparently thought that its 
natural filtration system would reduce the danger of pollution.  
In fact, it was designed to do just that.  Nevertheless, the 
record here could clearly support a finding that Chemical Leaman 
was "stonewalling" regulatory authorities.  There is a pattern of 
unfulfilled promises of compliance to state agency requests to 
abate the polluting discharge.  
         Even after officials caught Chemical Leaman discharging 
into the swamp in 1968 and ordered it to find a better way to 
treat wastes in 1969, Chemical Leaman did not improve the waste 
treatment system until the summer of 1975, when it entered into a 
disposal contract with Du Pont.  In the interim, 40 to 50 million 
gallons of contaminated waste water had been processed using the 
same treatment system.     
         Thus, from 1961, when the State first notified Chemical 
Leaman that the discharge to the swamp was unacceptable, until 
1975, when Chemical Leaman began off-site disposal at the Du Pont 
plant, Chemical Leaman responded to regulatory agencies with 
promises of compliance that went unfulfilled.  Chemical Leaman 
was informed that the discharge to the swamp was unacceptable.  
Although the state did not articulate why the discharge was 
improper, it is difficult to imagine what other reason Chemical 
Leaman could have attributed to the state's concern if not the 
impact of the discharge upon the environment.  It is clear from 
Chemical Leaman's own argument in this regard that it never 
attempted to ascertain the reason for the State's concern.   
         Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that in 1961 Chemical 
Leaman could not ascertain that its system was damaging the 
environment, there is no dispute that Chemical Leaman learned 
that the discharges to the swamp were likely to cause harm as of 
November of 1968, when it was expressly told that "the waste 
emanating from the lagoon is highly pollutional and [that] 
immediate measures [should] be taken to eliminate this discharge 
or to sufficiently treat the waste prior to discharge."  Even 
more telling is Harry Elston's concession at trial that both at 
the time of FGW's inspections in 1961 and 1962, and at the point 
when NJDOH issued its order in 1969, he knew that Chemical 
Leaman's discharge into the swamp was causing some damage to the 
swamp.  Finally, it should be noted that Chemical Leaman never 
obtained the required permits for its waste disposal cite.  Thus, 
it took regulatory authorities even longer to discover the 
"highly pollutional" discharge.  Once the cite was discovered, 
Chemical Leaman's compliance with regulatory agencies was less 
than exemplary.   
         Chemical Leaman discharged approximately 100 million 
gallons of contaminated waste water into its unlined ponds and 
lagoons for the fifteen years that the Bridgeport site was in 
operation.  The bottom of those lagoons was only two and a half 
feet above the groundwater, and the insurers' expert testified 
that the soil, groundwater, and swamp contamination was the 
probable result of this discharge.  That testimony was not 
refuted by Chemical Leaman's expert even though Chemical Leaman 
argues on appeal that their unlined treatment system was the 
state of the art.  
         I cannot say that such a course of conduct does not 
negate the existence of an occurrence under New Jersey law.  
                          V. Conclusion 
         Courts that have addressed the issue of the kind of 
intent that would negate insurance coverage under an occurrence- 
based policy have been guided by certain policy considerations. 
Courts have attempted to maximize the possibility that victims be 
compensated for their injuries while minimizing indemnification 
of the wrongdoer. See Voorhees, 607 A.2d. at 1264.  They have 
also been concerned that the law in this area deterred 
wrongdoers. See SL Industries, 607 A.2d at 1278. Looking to 
"exceptional circumstances" to objectively determine intent to 
harm the environment does just that. To the extent that those 
circumstances suggest that the insured did not intend 
environmental harm, and cooperated with regulatory authorities to 
avoid it, the insured will likely be indemnified for the cost of 
remediation under an occurrence policy even where it discharged a 
known pollutant.  To the extent that those circumstances 
establish a protracted and/or deliberate discharge, however, a 
disregard for the environment, knowledge of the properties of a 
pollutant, "stonewalling" regulatory agencies and the insured's 
subjective knowledge of the possibility of harm; "public policy 
and logic" require that the insured, and not its insurers, pay 
the cost of environmental cleanup. That allocation of cost deters 
persons from closing their eyes to the environmental impact of 
their activities.  
         Furthermore, this is consistent with the long-standing 
doctrine of enforcing insurance contracts in a manner that is 
consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties.  An 
insured cannot reasonably expect to escape the "occurrence-based" 
limits on its right to indemnification where "exceptional 
circumstances" establish its culpability for pollution. 
Similarly, an insurer should be able reasonably to expect that it 
will not be required to reimburse such a polluter for the 
environmental damage so callously caused.  
         This is the result the New Jersey Supreme Court sought 
to promote in Morton.  Yet, the rule we adopt today will give 
polluters comfort and allow them to discharge pollutants in 
relative safety because of the obvious impracticality of 
establishing their subjective intent to harm the environment.  
Since the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the impracticality 
of a subjective approach in environmental coverage disputes, I 
find it difficult to believe that it intended this result.  The 
majority concludes that the New Jersey Supreme Court established 
a subjective standard in environmental insurance disputes while 
proclaiming such a rule to be so impractical as to be unworkable.  
As a result, our holding places insurers in the impossible 
situation the New Jersey Supreme Court sought to avoid by its 
thoughtful pronouncement of an objective "exceptional 
circumstances" test in disputes over liability for cleaning up 
pollution.  
